Analysis of Dynamic Spectrum Management for Secondary Network  by Wang, Siye et al.
Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 2470 – 2474
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2012.01.334
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 
           Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000 
Procedia
Engineering
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
2012 International Workshop on Information and Electronics Engineering (IWIEE) 
Analysis of Dynamic Spectrum Management for Secondary 
Network 
Siye Wang, Zhenyu Liu*, Wenbiao Zhou, Yanjun Zhang, Dake Liu 
School of Information and Electronics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, 100081, China 
Abstract 
    Cognitive radios (CR) have a great potential to improve spectrum utilization by enabling users to access the spectrum dynamically 
without disturbing licensed primary users. Spectrum management is an important issue for spectrum sharing. The focus of this paper is 
spectrum management in secondary network, considering a non cooperative framework. Price utility function based power allocation 
will be analyzed and robust optimization will be involved in this paper. 
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1. introduction 
Cognitive radios (CR) is established in a hierarchical structure, in which differentiate primary users(PUs), 
who are licensed spectrum holders, from secondary users (SUs), who are permitted to share the licensed 
spectrum with PUs under the constraints of not introducing intolerable interference to PUs[1]. The 
cognitive radio comprises two basic operations: radio analysis at the receiver and spectrum management 
or power allocation at the transmitter. Iterative water-filling (IWF) was first proposed in 2002, where a 
non-cooperative game was used to model the spectrum management problem with each user maximizing 
its own rate[2]. It was illustrated that a Nash-equilibrium game such as IWF problem can be reformulated 
as a variational inequality (VI) problem[3]. The problem about pricing for uplink power control and price 
based spectrum management in cognitive radio networks was analyzed in [4] and [5]; however, the 
research did not involve the dynamic problem. In this paper, we study the problem of power allocation in 
CR networks involving pricing utility and robust optimization due to activities. 
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2. System Model 
Suppose that the bandwidth shared by the PUs and SUs can be divided into K subcarriers with assuming 
a frequency-flat fading channel. For the secondary network, the cross-channel transfer function over the 
k th subcarrier between transmitter of SU i and receiver of SU j is denoted by ijkh , for { }1, ,k K∈ L and 
{ }, 1, ,i j N∈ L . The transmit strategy of each SU i is given by the following constraints 
 
max1
{ : , 0 }Ki i i i peakk k k kkp p p p p== ≤ ≤ ≤∑iP   (1) 
Where max
ip is the sum power budget, peakkp is the peak power limit. Let 
i
kδ denote the total noise plus 
interference from PUs to SU i over channel k . For simplification, the noise plus interference experienced 
by user i at subcarrier k because of the transmission of other users is 
i i ij j
k k k kj i
I pσ α≠= +∑ .  Where 2i i iik k khσ δ= , 2 2ij ij iik k kh L hα = . (2) 
The constraint from the primary network is given by i ik k kp I MIC+ ≤ . While primary service providers 
charge SUs on the resource consumption such as transmission power can cause interference to PUs. Thus 
we consider pricing in power allocation problem during the interaction of primary users and secondary 
users. Thus, the utility of SU is given by 
log(1 )i i i i ik k k ku p I c p= + −   (3) 
3. Game-Theoretic Analysis for Spectrum Sharing Problem 
3.1. Pricing and Power Control 
  On the basis of the pricing utility function in (3), each SU iteratively chooses its power vector to 
maximize subject to the constraints listed in section 2. Non-cooperative game let SUs to solve the 
following problem 
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 (4) 
The Lagrangian function of the optimization problem in (4) for the user i is written as 
( ) ( ) ( )1 max1 1P , , P K NN i i i i i i ij j i ik k k k k k k kk jp p p MIC pμ γ σ α λ= == − + − + + − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑L uK  (5) 
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions[6] for the user i are as follows (where x y⊥ means that the 
two scalars (or vectors) a and b are orthogonal) 
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Proposition : If 1i i i ij jk k k k kj ic p pσ α≠≤ + +∑ , A Nash equilibrium game can be reformulated as a VI 
problem: 
T T* *1 * T(P , ,P )N=P K is a Nash equilibrium of the game if it is a solution of the following VI 
problem:     * T *(P P ) (P ) 0− ≥F                                                                                   
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Proof: To avoid triviality, we assume that 
max1
( ), 1, ,N i i ij jk k k kj j ip MIC p i Nσ α= ≠< − − ∀ =∑ ∑ ∑ K  (7) 
Since power is nonnegative and it is known that: 
1
0 1, , .Ni ij jk k kj p k Kσ α=+ > ∀ =∑ K   (8) 
If 0iμ = , then 1 ( )i i i i ij jk k k k k kj ic p pγ σ α≠+ ≥ + +∑ . As 1 ( )i i i ij jk k k k kj ic p pσ α≠≤ + +∑ , so 0ikγ >  leads to 
1
N ij j i
k k k kj
p MICα σ= = −∑ . For 0 1ijkα< < , we have max 1 ( )Ki i i ij jk k k k kk j ip p MIC pσ α= ≠≥ = − −∑ ∑ ∑ which 
contradicts (7). So we must have 0iμ > , changing the first constraint of (6), we can get 
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So we can rewrite first constraint of (6) as 
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Holding 
1
( )Ni i i ij jk k kj pμ η σ α== +∑ , 1( )Ni i ij jk k k kjik pγ σ αϕ == +∑ . Thus, the mixed linear complementarity 
problem (MLCP) (6) is the KKT condition for an affine variational inequality (AVI) problem[7], defined 
by the affine mapping 
( )P ( )= − +F I σ ΨP   (11) 
The variables in (12) can be concatenated as follows   
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3.2. Robust Optimization Approach 
In traditional research, many users co-exist over a long period of time. But in fact, the cognitive radio 
environment is dynamic. Due to the activities, the interference-plus-noise term in the utility function is 
time-varying. Similar to paper [8], we let the noise-plus-interference ikI% term be the summation of two 
components: a nominal term ikI and a perturbation term 
i
keΔ which is caused by dynamic of user set and 
imperfect CSI and ikeΔ belongs to an elliptical uncertainty region. 
In the sense described in [8] is basically a max-min problem[9], [10], in which each user tries to maximize 
its own utility while the environment and the other users are trying to minimize that user’s utility. The 
problem (7) can be formulated as the following optimization problem: 
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From the propositions above, we can use the following distributed algorithms in which the SUs 
sequentially or simultaneously update their power allocation by solving the optimization problem 
iteratively to reach the NE. Each SU determines its best behavior by measuring the total noise-plus-
interference over all channels. The best response of user is to maximize its utility function (15) subject to 
the constraints. The same procedure is repeated for all users in the secondary network. The optimization 
problem can be solved using lots of mathematical method, which is no longer described due to the 
limitation of length. 
4. Numerical Results 
In this section, numerical results are now illustrated to support the theoretical analysis of the previous 
sections. In our experiments, similar to [3], the background noise levels ikσ and the normalized interference 
gains ijkα are chosen randomly from the intervals ( )( )0,0.1/ 1N − , ( )( )0,1/ 1N − , respectively. The total 
power budgets max
ip are chosen uniformly from the interval ( ), / 2K K . The chosen values for noise levels 
and power constraints guarantee that the worst case i ik kp σ per subcarrier will be close to 7 dB. We select 
pricing coefficient ikc  using in [5], and the formulation can be denoted as  
( )( )
j ji
i k k
k j jn n j jn nj i
k k k k k kn j
p
c
p p
α
σ α σ α≠ ≠
= + +∑ ∑ ∑   (15) 
We set up a scenario that addresses a network with 4N = nodes and 2K = available subcarriers, and all 
of the SUs simultaneously update their transmit powers by our algorithm. At the fifth time-step, a new user 
joins the network, which increases the interference to the network. The interference gains are also changed 
randomly at different time instants to consider mobility of the users. The transmit power control simulation 
performance in a cognitive radio network using the non robust price based algorithm in [5] and our robust 
approach were presented in this section. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Sum rate comparison       (b) Total data rate with robust algorithm 
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Fig. 2. (a) Transmit powers with non-robust approach       (b) Transmit powers with robust approach 
Fig. 1(a) illustrated sum rate of pricing utility based algorithm versus classical IWFA.  Total data rate of 
network was demonstrated in fig. 1(b). Fig. 2(a) showed the transmit powers of five users at the first 
subcarrier using the non robust algorithm in [5]. Obviously, the transmit power of some users in the 
network couldn’t achieve convergence due to the dynamic nature. The transmit powers allocation using 
our robust approach was illustrated in Fig. 2(b).  
5. Conclusion 
   In this paper we have formulated a game problem for the pricing issue in a competitive secondary 
network. Moreover, we have designed a robust CR optimization problem, by taking into account of 
dynamic characteristic of CR with primary network and multiple non-cooperative SUs. We also proposed 
an iterative algorithm for the secondary network to achieve the competitive optimality. The best response 
of each SU has been obtained by solving the optimization problem. As a future work, we are interested in 
further analyzing the mobility of multiple SUs in the cognitive network.  
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